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Abstract
This paper argues that any assessment on the intentional stance of fiscal policy should be 
based upon all the information available to policymakers at the time of fiscal planning. In 
particular, real-time data on the discretionary fiscal policy "instrument", the structural 
primary balance, should be used in the estimation of fiscal policy reaction functions. In 
fact, the ex-post realization of discretionary fiscal measures may end up to be drastically 
different from what was planned by fiscal authorities in the budget law. When fiscal 
policy rules are estimated on real-time data, our results indicate that OECD countries 
often planned a counter-cyclical fiscal stance, especially during economic expansions, 
whereas conventional findings based on revised data point towards pro-cyclicality. This 
finding calls into question the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policies to fine tune the 
business cycle, as (pro-cyclical) actual outcomes tend to deviate from (counter-cyclical) 
fiscal plans. Furthermore, we test whether threshold effects might be at play in the 
reaction of fiscal policy to the economic cycle and to public debt accumulation. It 
emerges that the intended cyclical behavior of fiscal policy is characterized by two 
regimes, and that the switch between them is likely to occur when output is close to its 
equilibrium level. On the other hand, the use of revised data does not allow to identify 
any threshold effect. 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, real-time data, revision errors, endogenous threshold models. 
JEL Classification: C23, E30, E62, H30, H60 5
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Non-technical summary
Most of the empirical literature on ﬁscal policy has found that, over the post-World War II
period, governments in developing and industrialized countries have reacted “pro-cyclically”
to ﬂuctuations in the economic activity (see e.g. Lane (2003b) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and
Vegh (2004)). Otherwise stated, budgetary decisions such as tax increases and retrench-
ments of public spending implemented in “bad times” would have tended to aggravate the
length and the severity of economic recessions. On the other side, expansive policies put
in place during “good times” would have led economic booms to be more prolonged and
vigorous.
This empirical evidence has been mainly drawn from the estimation of ﬁscal policy
reaction functions, relating a policy indicator to the output gap and other explanatory
variables, and based on the use of revised data, i.e. data available in an “updated” form
to the econometrician at the time the study is carried out. Since many economic variables
are seriously contaminated by revision errors, however, revised data may be substantially
diﬀerent from the ones available in “real-time” to policymakers at the time of budgeting. In
other words, as shown by Orphanides (2001) in the framework of monetary policy analysis,
unrealistic assumptions about the timeliness of data availability may induce misleading
assessments on the historical policy stance. Nevertheless, although informational problems
clearly matter also for the evaluation of the ﬁscal policy stance, little has been done in this
ﬁeld.
In the present study we show that, when the object of interest is intentional stance of
ﬁscal policy, real-time information on all the variables included in a ﬁscal policy rule should
be employed. In particular, it is highlighted that the use of real-time observations on the
ﬁscal policy “instrument”, i.e. the structural primary balance, may be of key importance.
In fact, and in contrast with central bankers who can control their operating instrument,
the short-term interest rate, with great precision, the actual realization of planned ﬁscal
measures may depend on several factors outside the direct control of ﬁscal authorities.
Hence, there might be sizeable diﬀerences between discretionary ﬁscal measures as planned
in the past and what it is observed ex-post,f o rt h es a m ey e a r s .
Based on a dataset of revised and real-time observations drawn from the December
Issues of the OECD Economic Outlook for 19 industrialized countries, from 1994 to 2006,
it is shown that the stance of ﬁscal policy seems to be pro-cyclical, if evaluated ex-post.
When real-time data are used in the estimation of ﬁscal policy rules, however, the ex-
ante stance appears to be counter-cyclical, especially during buoyant economic times. The
analytical form of the bias incurred in evaluating the intentional stance of the policy using
revised data is formally derived. It is demonstrated that the size and the sign of that bias
can be accurately predicted, based on empirical second-order moments of revisions errors
in the variables of interest.
Finally, the possible presence of non-linearities in the way the discretionary component6
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of ﬁscal policy reacts to the economic cycle and debt accumulation is tested. It emerges
that the intentional behavior of ﬁscal policy is characterized by two regimes, and that the
switch between them, from a neutral or slightly pro-cyclical stance to a counter-cyclical
one, is likely to occur when output is close to its potential level. However, the hypothesis
of threshold eﬀects is always rejected when the analysis is based on revised data.7
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1 Introduction
The active use of ﬁscal policy to ﬁne tune the business cycle has not ceased to be a contro-
versial issue among economists. The traditional Keynesian school generally recommends
that governments should actively operate to smooth economic ﬂuctuations. In particular,
during phases of weak economic growth, they should adopt measures, such as tax cuts or
new public investments, to foster a recovery in the economic activity. In contrast, when
growth is above potential, they should cut public expenditures or increase taxation. In
other words, they should act counter-cyclically over the economic cycle.
The Keynesian doctrine has heavily inﬂuenced the conduct of economic policies in the
post-World War II period. However, from the 1950s on, and especially during the 1970s and
the 1980s, Keynesianism was at the center of a very intense debate. In particular, according
to economists in the “New Classical” tradition (see Sargent and Wallace (1975), Lucas and
Sargent (1978), and more recently Chari and Kehoe (1999)), discretionary ﬁscal policies
may end up to be helpless, or even harmful. In that view, the active use of ﬁscal policy
as a stabilizing tool should be discouraged since: i) recessions might be “self-correcting”;1
ii) there are long and uncertain time lags in the implementation of ﬁscal measures; iii)
institutional constraints may prevent a timely use of ﬁscal policy; iv) ﬁscal policy decisions
are, often, irreversible.2
Yet some authors have recently argued that ﬁscal policy, rather than being counter-
cyclical, as Keynesian theories suggest, or acyclical, as advocated by the New Classical
macroeconomics, has shown a tendency towards pro-cyclicality.
Among the ﬁrst who explored the issue of pro-cyclicality, Gavin and Perotti (1997) ﬁnd
that ﬁscal policy in Latin America countries has been characterized as lax during upturns
and tight during slowdowns. Lane (2003a) shows that the “pro-cyclicality bias” is more
severe for developing countries than for developed ones. As for the OECD economies, Lane
(2003c) argues that spending categories are characterized by diﬀerent levels of cyclicality
and that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are most likely aﬀected
1New Classical models predict that the market itself takes steps to recover from recessions. In fact, once
entrepreneurs realize that a recession is under way, they cut prices to attract new consumers. Workers,
in turn, curb their wage demands to reduce unemployment. Thus, the real money supply and aggregate
demand automatically rise and, without any government intervention, the output gap shrinks.
2The spirit underlying the creation of the European Union ﬁscal framework, as embedded in the Maas-
tricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, is to some extent rooted in this debate. The Pact, in
fact, suggests that ﬁscal stabilization should be achieved mainly through the work of automatic stabilizers,
once member countries have achieved their medium-term ﬁscal position of “close-to-balance or in surplus”
(see Brunila, Buti and in’t Veld (2002) and Buti and Sapir (2006)). In this context, discretionary ﬁscal
measures are recommended only to the extent that excessive deﬁcits need to be corrected and to reach
balanced budget positions. In particular, the new version of the Pact (as from the ECOFIN Council of
March 2005) lays down that Member States characterized by excessive deﬁcits should pursue annual im-
provements of their cyclically-adjusted balances, net of one-oﬀ and other temporary measures, of at least
0.5 of GDP as benchmark.8
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by pro-cyclical ﬁscal policies. Focusing on the same set of countries, the OECD (2003)
emphasizes that the stance of ﬁscal policy tends to be predominantly counter-cyclical in
“bad” times and pro-cyclical in “good” ones. Similar results emerge from a study by the
European Commission (2004) on euro area countries, thereby suggesting that the EU ﬁscal
framework would have not helped to eradicate the occurrence of a pro-cyclical bias during
booming economic periods.
Summing up, the empirical evidence from this literature seems to be quite consensual as
regards developing countries, pointing to strong pro-cyclicality, whereas results on indus-
trialized economies are more controversial, indicating however some form of pro-cyclicality,
in particular during upturns, and especially after 1999.
These studies, though insightful in that they allow to evaluate the ex-post,o r“ r e a l -
ized”, stance of ﬁscal policy, are not suitable to assess the “true”, or intentional,p o l i c y
stance since they are based on revised data and not on the information actually available
(i.e. available in real-time) to policy-makers at the time their decisions have been taken.
However, as Orphanides (2001) shows, when unrealistic assumptions on the timeliness of
data availability are made, and in particular when it is supposed that the updated, revised
information is available ex-ante to decision makers, the analysis of policy-makers behavior
may be drastically misleading.3
Since the seminal work of Orphanides (2001), research employing real-time data has
soared in the monetary policy literature (see e.g. Boivin (2005), Croushore and Stark
(2001), Giannone, Reichlin and Sala (2005), Ironside and Tetlow (2005)). However, al-
though problems related to revisions errors and timeliness of information clearly matter
also for the evaluation of the ﬁscal policy stance, little has been done in the ﬁeld of ﬁscal
policy analysis. An important exception is the paper by Forni and Momigliano (2005).
These authors estimate, for a panel of OECD countries, ﬁscal policy rules linking changes
of a discretionary ﬁscal policy indicator, the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance
as percentage of potential GDP, to the output gap and public debt. They use revised
data for the policy instrument and the debt indicator, and revised versus real-time data
for the output gap. They show that, when real-time information on cyclical conditions is
incorporated, the discretionary stance of ﬁscal policy is gauged to be counter-cyclical, both
in euro area and non-euro area OECD countries, but just during slowdowns.4
3In the framework of monetary policy, since data on the potential output and output gaps (and to a
minor extent the ones on inﬂation) are known with some accuracy only many quarters after the interest
rate move has been decided, assessments based on monetary policy rules may be incorrect if revised data
are used in the estimation.
4Loukoianova, Vahey and Wakerly (2003) construct a real-time data set for the U.S. primary surplus.
However, they do not provide regression estimates based on their real-time data. Moreover, the ﬁscal policy
indicator used is not cyclically adjusted. Therefore, the eﬀects of automatic stabilizers and discretionary
measures cannot be disentangled. More recently, Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) include real-time ob-
servations of the primary balance on the right-hand side of their regression equation, but they use revised
data for dependent variable.9
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However, when the intentional stance of ﬁscal policy is considered, it might be of
crucial importance to make correct assessments on the timeliness of information on the
ﬁscal policy “instrument” itself. Typically, in fact, in each autumn of year t − 1,ﬁ s c a l
authorities approve the budget for year t. Budget laws are mainly designed on the basis of
ex-ante projections on the state of the economy, and of the perceived evolution of inherited
public deﬁcits and debts. In addition, the realization of planned ﬁscal measures depends
importantly on implementations lags. Therefore, there might be relevant discrepancies
between discretionary ﬁscal measures as approved ex-ante and what is observed several
periods after decisions have been taken.5
In this paper, we gauge the “intentional” stance of ﬁscal policy in OECD countries
based on an information set which closely mimic the one available to governments at the
time of ﬁscal planning. Data sources are past issues of the OECD Economic Outlook
since, as spelled out more in detail below, this has several advantages compared to the
use of revised data, of “oﬃcial” governments’ projections, and of projections released by
other international institutions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to
incorporate real-time observations on all the “ingredients” typically used in the estimation
of ﬁscal policy rules.6 In particular, ﬁscal plans as reported at the time of budgeting are
employed.7 Speciﬁcally, the following contributions are put forward:
Firstly, a real-time annual dataset is constructed by collecting data on some key ﬁscal
and macroeconomic variables published in the December Issues of the OECD Economic
Outlook from 1994 (Volume 56) to 2006 (Volume 80), for 19 OECD countries.
Second, simple ﬁscal policy rules, relating the cyclically-adjusted primary balance as
indicator of discretionary ﬁscal policies, to the output gap, are estimated for this set
of industrialized countries over the 1994-2006 period. It is shown that the inclusion of
real-time observations of the capb revert the sign of the estimated parameter representing
the cyclical sensitivity of discretionary policies: estimates based on ex-post data point to
pro-cyclicality, as conventional, whereas estimates stemming from real-time data indicate
counter-cyclicality. In addition, it is shown that the bias incurred in estimating a simple
ﬁscal policy rule using revised data, when the intentional ﬁscal policy stance is the object
interest, can be accurately predicted based on the empirical covariances between revision
5Note that this issue is not relevant for monetary policy analysis. In fact, under normal circumstances,
central bankers can control their operating instruments with great accuracy. In particular, short-term
interest rates are subject to negligible revisions, and just for few days after the ﬁrst release of data. On
the contrary, the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, as indicator of the discretionary component of ﬁscal
policy, incorporates three sources of uncertainty and possible measurement errors: the level of nominal
deﬁcit, nominal output and potential output, which depends on estimates of the cyclical component of
GDP. All of them are subject to considerable revisions.
6See also Cimadomo (2007) for an earlier version of this work.
7The proposed approach has been recently followed by Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) to gauge how
budgetary decisions in one country may be aﬀected by ﬁscal plans announced in other countries, and by
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008) to test how OECD governments have reacted to unexpected information
about the business cycle.10
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errors in capb s and in output gaps, and on other second-order moments.
Third, more encompassing ﬁscal policy rules are estimated, where movements in the
ﬁscal policy indicator are assumed to depend not only on cyclical conditions, but also on
debt developments and on a set of other control variables, similarly to Galì and Perotti
(2003). Again, it is documented that the use of revised observations for the ﬁscal policy
instrument leads to an “attenuation bias”, since the regression slope on the output gap is
estimated to be lower, suggesting pro-cyclicality, than what obtained using real-time data.
Moreover, when positive and negative output gaps are included separately it emerges that,
ex-post, ﬁscal policy seems pro-cyclical in expansions and a-cyclical in recessions. However,
when real-time data are used, the stance is gauged to be strongly counter-cyclical during
upturns and a-cyclical in slowdowns.
Finally, we explore whether the discretionary reaction of ﬁscal policy to the business
cycle and to debt accumulation is characterized by multiple regimes. A two-stage procedure
applied to the Hansen’s (1999) threshold panel regression model is proposed. Based on
this approach, it is found that the hypothesis of a switch in the ex-ante cyclical behavior
of ﬁscal policy (from acyclicality to counter-cyclicality) occurring when GDP is close to its
equilibrium level cannot be rejected. Interestingly, the use of revised data does not allow
to discriminate between any regime in the conduct of ﬁscal policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the advantages
of using cyclically-adjusted balances published in “real-time” by the OECD as proxies for
intentional ﬁscal plans. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 is devoted to illustrate the
ﬁscal policy reaction functions used in the empirical analysis and the estimation results. In
particular, Section 4.1 shows our ﬁnding for simple ﬁscal rules, Section 4.2 describes how
revision errors in variables may aﬀect estimation results, Section 4.3 focuses on baseline
ﬁscal policy rules’ estimates and Section 4.4 investigates the possible presence of multiple
regimes in the conduct of ﬁscal policy. Finally, Section 5 reports some robustness exercises
and Section 6 concludes.
2 How should we measure “ex-ante” ﬁscal plans?
Changes in governments’ revenues and expenditures and, as a consequence, in budget bal-
ances, are driven by two main sources. On the one hand, business cycle ﬂuctuations aﬀect
budget balances through the operation of automatic stabilizers.8 Automatic stabilization
implies that we would observe movements in balances even in absence of any legislative
intervention by governments.
On the other hand, ﬁscal authorities may decide to actively intervene on public accounts
8Examples of automatic stabilizers are, on the revenue side, corporate and individual tax receipts that
automatically vary due to changes in income, for given tax rates and a given deﬁnition of the tax base.
Among government expenditure items, unemployment compensation is the most inﬂuenced by output
ﬂuctuations.11
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by, for instance, cutting tax rates or increasing public expenditures. The bulk of such
discretionary interventions is generally incorporated in the budget law for year t as enacted
by national parliaments in (autumn of) year t − 1.9
Typically, two approaches have been followed to measure the discretionary component
of budget balances, or of other ﬁscal policy indicators. The recent “narrative” approach,
proposed by Romer and Romer (2007) for the analysis of the eﬀects of tax reductions on the
U.S. economic activity, is based on the idea of collecting single episodes of policy change
and to record the timing and the magnitude of their (expected) eﬀects, as reported by
oﬃcial documents (i.e. past budget laws, Economic Reports of the President, Congressional
Records). This method, since based on governmental historical sources, should be eﬀective
in capturing policymakers’ discretionary plans, or intentions. However, ﬁscal decisions as
planned in the past may fail to (fully) materialize, due for example to diﬀerences between
the output growth as perceived at the time of budgeting and the actual one.10 Therefore,
what we observe ex-post, in budget balances, could turn out to be considerably diﬀerent
from what planned in the past, and captured by the record of legislated measures. In
other words, such an approach could be inappropriate to assess the “realized”, as opposed
to ex-ante,s t a n c eo fﬁ s c a la u t h o r i t i e s .
Alternatively, the discretionary component of ﬁscal policies may be isolated through
cyclical-adjustment methods. Once the eﬀects due to automatic stabilization (and interest
payments) are netted out from headline nominal balances, the residual (or “structural”)
component, should capture the discretionary stance of ﬁscal authorities. Clearly, if the in-
tentional stance of ﬁscal authorities is under investigation, cyclical-adjustment procedures
should be applied to budget balances as reported when decisions have been taken, using
ex-ante projections of output gaps. In this case, the resulting cyclically-adjusted compo-
nent of the balance should closely track the record of discretionary measures as planned in
the past.
Hence, in this paper we propose to use the cyclically-adjusted (primary) balance for
years’ t as reported in years’ t − 1 December editions of the OECD Economic Outlook as
proxy of the intentional, or ex-ante, stance of ﬁscal policy authorities in 19 OECD coun-
9To be noted, discretionary measures may be decided for a variety of reasons. For example, governments
may want to dampen output ﬂuctuations, in case they deem that automatic stabilizers do not work
eﬃciently enough. Moreover, they might react to inherited budget deﬁcits and debts, especially in those
countries aﬀected by a system of ﬁscal rules, and to the extent that they are concerned about the long-
term sustainability of public ﬁnances. In addition, governments may intervene on the “quality” of public
expenditure and taxation, for example by allocating resources on items more likely to promote long-term
economic growth and job creation. An upcoming election, and further factors, may also induce government
to implement discretionary measures.
10For example, the estimated impact, in terms of revenue eﬀects, of a revision of income tax brackets
or marginal tax rates depends crucially on the actual evolution of the tax base. This, as depends on
the state of the economy, might be substantially diﬀerent from government’s projections. Moreover, since
governments often design their discretionary interventions in terms of ratios to GDP, outcomes might be
sensibly diﬀerent from plans as long as GDP projections result to be inaccurate.12
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tries. This approach has several advantages relative to alternative methods. In particular,
implementing Romer and Romer’s (2007) approach would be a daunting task in the present
context, since many countries are involved in the analysis and a history of legislated policy
changes should be gathered for each of them. Moreover, employing OECD data should
improve cross-country comparability, since variables’ deﬁnitions and accounting standards
are homogeneous. As an alternative, one could use cyclically-adjusted balances as pub-
lished by oﬃcial authorities, as for example the ones reported in Stability and Convergence
Programmes. However, as documented by several authors (see e.g. Annett (2006), Jonung
and Larch (2004), Strauch, Hallerberg and von Hagen (2004)), these data are often af-
fected by a “political bias” inducing an overly optimistic outlook on the state of public
ﬁnances. In this respect, projections provided by the OECD are likely to be more reli-
able since, although the original sources of OECD data are still national statistical oﬃces,
the OECD staﬀ applies judgment and ﬁlters out unrealistic ﬁgures when compiling its
statistics. Indeed, OECD ﬁscal forecasts are generally found to be unbiased, as systematic
under or over-predictions of budgetary ﬁgures are rare (see in particular Artis and Mar-
cellino (2001)). An additional advantage of using OECD data is related to the timing of
their release. In fact, OECD projections are published in December and, as a consequence,
they are likely to reﬂect the full set of discretionary measures incorporated in national
budget laws, which are generally approved at the end of the year by national parliaments.
Projections from other institutional institutions, such as the IMF or the European Com-
mission, could also be employed. Yet, we opt for the OECD as reference source of data
for two main reasons. First, although the methodology employed to net out the eﬀects
of the economic cycle from ﬁscal aggregates, and the elasticities used to gauge cyclical
sensitivity of single budget items, may change across institutions, cyclically-adjusted indi-
cators published by the IMF and the European Commission are broadly in line with the
ones released by the OECD. Second, the availability of several past issues of the OECD
Economic Outlook makes the construction of a relatively large real-time dataset feasible.
In the light of these arguments, real-time OECD data on capb’s, but also on other key
ﬁscal and macroeconomic variables, are gathered. This should enable to plausibly mimic
the information set available to policymaker at the time budgetary decisions have been
taken.
3 A real-time dataset for ﬁscal policy analysis
We construct a real-time annual dataset based on the December Issues of the OECD
Economic Outlook from 1994 (Volume 56) to 2006 (Volume 80). The December Editions
of the Outlook of each year t typically publish data spanning the previous sixteen years,
“estimates” for the current-year and “forecasts” for years t +1and t +2 . Our sample
includes 19 OECD countries: Germany, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Spain, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway,13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 919
July 2008
the United States, Canada, Japan and Australia. Data for three reference indicators
have been collected: the output gap (deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP as
percentage of potential GDP), deﬁned hereafter as x11, the general government debt (gross
ﬁnancial liabilities) to nominal GDP ratio, deﬁned as d, and the cyclically-adjusted primary
balance as percentage of potential GDP, deﬁned as capb. Our real-time dataset is built
on by inputting the current-year estimates, and the one year-ahead forecasts, of these
key variables. Furthermore, current-year estimates of real GDP annual growth rates and
of general government ﬁnancial balances as percentage of nominal GDP have also been
gathered. These additional indicators will be used as control variables in the baseline
estimations (ﬁnancial balances) and in the proposed robustness exercises (real GDP growth
rates).12
Given a generic variable z, and a country i, we follow this notation: zi,t|t−1 denotes
the one-year-ahead forecast of z, for country i, as estimated in vintage t − 1; zi,t−1|t−1
indicates the current-year estimate of z,r e l e a s e di nv i n t a g et − 1 and zi,t refers to revised
data which, in the present context, are the ones from the December 2006 vintage. To be
noted, the discretionary ﬁscal policy “instrument” used in the paper is capbi,t|t−1, i.e. the
one-year ahead forecast of the capb.
The relationships between real-time and revised observations of some key variables used
in the rest of the paper are deﬁned as follows
xi,t = xi,t|t + νx
i,t,
capbi,t = capbi,t|t−1 + ν
capb
1,i,t ,
capbi,t = capbi,t|t + ν
capb
i,t ,






i,t are the revision errors in the current-year estimates of the
output gap, the capb and d respectively; ν
capb
1,i,t is the revision error in the one-year-ahead
forecast of the capb. Notice that in the present framework, contrary to the standard
approach, we consider as “correct” the observations reported in real-time, since we are
interested in the ex-ante behavior of the policymaker.13
11The OECD began to release output gap data for all countries just in 1995. In 1994, however, estimates
of the output gap were available for the G7 countries. For the remaining countries, the estimates provided
by Forni and Momigliano (2005) are used. In addition, the OECD started to publish data on cyclically-
adjusted primary balances just in 2002. Then, for the period 1994-2001, the capb has been constructed by
adding data on net debt interest payments to the ones on structural balances.
12Overall, more than 25.000 observations have been recorded from electronic or hard copies of the OECD
Economic Outlook.
13Of course, this does not have any implication for the absolute value of revision errors and on their
second-order moments.14
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Figure 1, 2 and 3 display, as illustrative examples, two diﬀerent vintages of data (2000
and 2006) for the variables of main interest. Even from a simple visual inspection, it can be
noted that the data from ﬁrst vintage are often largely diﬀerent from what observed in the
2006 one. For instance, the Italian potential GDP for years 2000 and 2001, was perceived,
in 2000, to be much stronger that it actually was, as shown by the 2006 estimates of
the output gap for those years being around three percentage points higher than what
published in the December 2000 Economic Outlook (Figure 1).
The mean absolute value of the revisions over the period of observation, as a summary
statistic to gauge the magnitude of measurement errors, is reported in Table 1. From
the ﬁrst Column of Table 1 it emerges that, albeit for some countries (notably Belgium,
the Netherlands and Australia) the output gap has been quite accurately measured, on
average, over the last thirteen years; for the remaining ones revisions are generally large.
For instance, these amount to more than two percentage points in the Finnish and Japanese
case. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the capb has also been inaccurately estimated for
many of the countries in the sample. Given that this indicator is computed as a function of
the output gap, countries for which x has been poorly measured also display large revision
errors in the one-year-ahead forecasts and the current-year estimates of the capb (Columns
2 and 3, Table 1). The fourth Column of the Table, and Figure 3, indicate that the level
of debt-output ratio as reported in year t is often remarkably diﬀerent from what observed
at the end of the sample, due to errors in measurement but also to possible changes in
statistical deﬁnitions and accounting rules.14 Revisions to this indicator are the largest for
high debt countries such as Greece and Japan, but also for Norway.
Table 2 reports, for each country in the sample, the empirical correlations between
revision errors in one-year ahead forecasts of the capb, and revision errors in current-year
estimates of the output gap, the capb and the debt to GDP ratio. Column 1 shows that
ν
capb
1,i,t is negatively correlated with νx
i,t−1 for all i =1 ,...,19. Since the capb is computed by
subtracting a function of the output gap from the primary balance, it seems reasonable to
observe that upward (downward) revisions in the output gap are associated with downward









uniform across countries, and approximately distributed around a zero mean value.
14For instance, in the case of Canada, a vertical shift of around 20 percentage points of GDP is observed
between the 2000 vintage and the 2006 one, as shown in Figure 3. This is explained by a change in the
statistical deﬁnition of general government gross ﬁnancial liabilities for Canada, occurring in 2002. In
fact, before 2002, funded government employees pension liabilities were included in this indicator whereas
starting from 2002 these have been netted out by the OECD, for consistency with other countries.15
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4 Assessing the stance of ﬁscal policy in real-time
4.1 Simple ﬁscal policy rules
Attempts to model the behavior of ﬁscal authorities in terms of a “policy reaction function”
are relatively recent in the empirical literature on ﬁscal policy. Taylor (2000a)a n dT a y l o r
(2000b) argue that the conduct of ﬁscal policy may be well approximated by a rule (here-
after referred to as “simple” or “Taylor” ﬁscal rule) relating a measure of the ﬁscal policy
stance, as represented by the capb, to deviations of actual output from its equilibrium level.
Generally, “revised” data, i.e. observations from the latest available release, are used
in the estimation of such rules. However, as suggested by Orphanides (2001), when the
interest of the researcher is on the evaluation of the intentional,o rex-ante, policy stance,
all the information actually available to the policymaker at the time decisions have been
taken should be used. In a ﬁscal policy reaction function framework, and in contrast
with monetary Taylor rules, this information set should include real-time observations on
the “operating instrument” in the hands of budgetary authorities, i.e. the discretionary
component of the budget balance. In fact, a certain objective in terms of budget balance
as planned in the current year may end up to be drastically diﬀerent from what observed
several years later, based on revised data.
To evaluate the potential impact of making “unreasonable” assumptions regarding the
timeliness of information available to the ﬁscal policymaker, when the interest is on the
ex-ante stance of governments, we proceed as follows: as a starting step, we estimate a
simple ﬁscal policy rule relating the capb to the (lagged) output gap. Lagged values of the
output gap are used to avoid possible endogeneity problems stemming from the fact that
ﬁscal policy measures may aﬀect the real activity in the same period. The sample includes
the whole panel of 19 OECD countries, and ranges over the 1994-2006 period. First, only
revised data (i.e. the ones from the December 2006 vintage) are used in the estimation:
capbi,t = αi + βxi,t−1 + εi,t. (1)
Then, current-year (real-time) estimates of the output gap are employed:
capbi,t = αi + βxi,t−1|t−1 + εi,t. (2)
Finally, real-time ﬁgures for both the capb and x are incorporated:
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + βxi,t−1|t−1 + εi,t. (3)
In the equations above, (unobserved) country-speciﬁc eﬀects are captured by the terms
αi, which should also help to control for systematic biases leading to over (under) reporting16
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of ﬁscal stances. Table 3 shows the results, based on Fixed-Eﬀect (Within) Least-Squares
(FE-LS). The estimated cyclical sensitivity parameter shown in the ﬁrst Column indicates
that when revised data are used for both variables, the stance of ﬁscal policy seems to be
signiﬁcantly pro-cyclical, as conventionally found in most of the literature on ﬁscal rules.
When real-time values of the output gap are employed (Column 2), ˆ β is close to zero, and
becomes insigniﬁcant. The third Column displays the results obtained by using real-time
data for both the dependent variable and the independent one. Interestingly, the estimated
regression slope turns positive, indicating counter-cyclicality, and it is signiﬁcant at the
1% level.15 This implies that assessments on the intentional stance of ﬁscal authorities
based on the estimation of simple ﬁscal rules could be highly misleading when updated
information, in the form of revised data, is used.
4.2 Bias prediction
The discretionary ﬁscal policy indicator, i.e. the capb, and the explanatory variable, i.e.
the output gap, incorporated in a simple ﬁscal policy rule as the one presented above, are
contaminated by large measurement errors (see Table 1), which seem to be also highly
cross-correlated (see Table 2). In the classical regression framework, the use of variables
aﬀected by measurement errors may invalidate the properties of commonly used estima-
tors. A well known pitfall of Least Squares (LS) estimators, for instance, is that they
become inconsistent when the independent variables included in the regression are mea-
sured with error (see for example Johnston and DiNardo (1997)). This eventually calls for
Instrumental Variable methods, provided that appropriate instruments are found. Under
standard assumptions, on the other hand, the presence of measurement errors in the de-
pendent variable impacts on the variance of LS estimators, but not on their consistency.
This holds also in panel regressions. Therefore, applying the FE-LS estimator to model
(3) above, where the one-year-ahead forecast of the capb is included in the left-hand-side
of the regression equation, should asymptotically (for N,T →∞ ) yield the same results
(in terms of point estimates) as when revised data are used for the dependent variable.
Here it is shown that when the conventional assumption of uncorrelatedness between
measurement errors is dropped, and this seems to be in line with the results presented in
Table 2, the FE-LS estimator becomes biased and inconsistent not only due to measurement
errors in the regressor, as in the standard case, but also to the fact that revision errors in
the dependent variable and the independent one might be correlated. The potential impact
of correlated measurement errors has been already explored in the time series literature
(see e.g. Haitovsky (1972)). In a panel regression framework, Biørn (1992) models the
15The R
2 of the Within regression is low across all the three experiments. This is due to the fact that the
process governing the capb is very persistent. Hence, as shown below, the introduction of a term capturing
inertia in budgetary decisions improves the regression ﬁt dramatically. Note however that when real-time
observations of both the variables included in the simple ﬁscal rule are used (Column 3), around 6% of the
variability in the capb is explained by the output gap.17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 919
July 2008
eﬀects of applying the “Within”, the “Between” and the diﬀerence transformation to the
data, when observations on the regressors are contaminated by measurement errors. To
our knowledge, the extension to the case of correlated measurement errors in the dependent
variable and in the explanatory ones has not been addressed yet in the literature on panel
data.
Let us consider a simple ﬁscal policy rule as in Section 4.1, where the dependent variable
is capbt|t−1 and the explanatory one is xt−1|t−1. The structural equation of interest is the
following
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + βxi,t−1|t−1 + εi,t, (4)
where εi,t ∼ i.i.d(0,σ2
ε). Suppose that the “true”, or real-time, values of the capb and x
are not observed. Instead, we observe the revised data, denoted by capbi,t and xi,t−1. As
underlined before, in this framework we consider as “true” the real-time observations since
we are interested in studying an ex-ante relation between variables.
Under a certain set of assumptions, and in particular allowing ν
capb
1,i,t and νx
i,t−1 to be con-
temporaneously correlated, Appendix A formally shows that the asymptotic bias incurred












˜ x∗ is the variance of the “true” values of x, pooled across groups after removing
individual means; σ2




is the covariance between demeaned and pooled revisions errors in x and capb,
and β is the true parameter.16 Equation (5) implies that we will tend to overestimate β
when σ˜ νx˜ ν
capb
1
is positive and to underestimate it when it is negative, i.e. an “attenuation
bias” would arise. The standard textbook case assumes σ˜ νx˜ ν
capb
1
=0 , and the bias will be
inﬂuenced only by measurement errors in the independent variable.
Replacing the empirical counterparts of the theoretical second-order moments included
in (5), and assuming that the “true” β is the one obtained from the real-time regression, it
will be possible to accurately predict the size and the direction of the bias. It particular,




˜ x∗ +ˆ σ2
˜ νx






˜ x∗ =1 .54, ˆ σ2
˜ νx =1 .75, ˆ σ˜ νx˜ ν
capb
1
= −1.14 and β =0 .35. To be noted, by
adding the estimated (negative) bias to the “true” β we get -0.18, a value very close to
the regression slope obtained from revised data and equal to -0.14. This suggests that
16Note that the derivation of the asymptotic bias reported in 5 is robust to the assumption that revision
errors might be autocorrelated, as shown in Appendix A.18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 919
July 2008
using revised data to assess the ex-ante stance of ﬁscal policy leads to an underestimation
of the cyclical sensitivity coeﬃcient, which becomes negative, (mistakenly) implying a
pro-cyclical stance.17 As a byproduct, the relative contribution to the overall bias of the
revision errors in x, and of the covariance between these revision errors and the ones in
the capb, is computed. The former source accounts for 34% of the total bias, whereas the
latter explain 66%, indicating that, in this framework, ignoring to model revision errors in
the dependent variable may be drastically misleading.
When more complex speciﬁcations of the regression equation are considered, and in
particular when the number of independent variables is large, the derivation of the ana-
lytical form of the bias is more cumbersome since it will depend on the cross-correlations
among all measurement errors. Yet, as in the simpler bivariate case, it can be shown in
which direction the covariance between measurement errors in the dependent variable and
in the output gap contributes to the overall bias.18 To be noted, the estimator will be
unbiased only in the (unlikely) case that all the second-order moments included in the
functional form of the bias cancel out.
4.3 Baseline ﬁscal policy rules
Simple ﬁscal policy rules as the ones presented in Section 4.1 may suﬀer from an omitted
variable problem, since ﬁscal authorities are likely to react not only to cyclical develop-
ments, but also to current deﬁcits, to the debt to GDP ratio as indicator of long-term ﬁscal
sustainability (see in particular Bohn (1998)), and to other possible indicators. Therefore,
the latest generation of ﬁscal policy rules includes a (relatively) large set of explanatory
variables to account for movements in the policy indicator, which is commonly selected to
be the structural primary balance when the discretionary stance of ﬁscal policy is under
investigation.
In the light of these arguments, we assess the impact of incorporating real-time in-
formation based on a more encompassing ﬁscal policy reaction function, similar to the
one proposed by Galì and Perotti (2003). As before, a “backward-looking” speciﬁcation
of the rule is proposed, to avoid possible feedbacks stemming from the fact that ﬁscal
measures may impact on output contemporaneously.19 A battery of four ﬁscal policy rules
is estimated, where the amount of real-time information is progressively increased, from a
“fully-revised” scenario to a “fully-real-time” one:
17The use of IV estimators might contribute to mitigate this endogeneity problem, but unless a matrix
of instruments, perfectly uncorrelated with measurement errors and residuals εi,t, and correlated with the
revised xi,t is found, the estimator will still be inconsistent. In a time series regression framework, for
instance, Orphanides (2001) estimates monetary Taylor rules using real-time data and IV methods and
shows that the estimated coeﬃcients are far from the ones obtained with revised data.
18Formal proof available from the author.
19As a robustness exercise, ﬁscal policy rules including contemporaneous output gaps (or one-year ahead
forecasts) as independent variables are also estimated, as shown in Section 5.19
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i) Revised-data: capb,x,d,emu; no real-time data (“fully-revised” rule);
capbi,t = αi + ρcapbi,t−1 + βxi,t−1 + θdi,t−1 + ψemu i,t−1 + εi,t. (6)
ii) Revised-data: capb,d,emu; real-time data: x;
capbi,t = αi + ρcapbi,t−1 + βxi,t−1|t−1 + θdi,t−1 + ψemu i,t−1 + εi,t. (7)
iii) Revised-data: capb; real-time data: d,x,emu;
capbi,t = αi + ρcapbi,t−1 + βxi,t−1|t−1 + θdi,t−1|t−1 + ψemu i,t−1|t−1 + εi,t. (8)
iv) No revised-data; real-time data: capb,x,d,emu(“fully-real-time” rule);
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1 + βxi,t−1|t−1 + θdi,t−1|t−1 + ψemu i,t−1|t−1 + εi,t. (9)
where emu is a dummy variable which equals one in years when the total deﬁcit ex-
ceeded the 3% limit imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact,
for the countries having joined the European Monetary Union, and zero otherwise. The
idea is that, during the convergence process (i.e. before 1997), EMU governments may
have had incentives to curb public deﬁcits when they were higher than the 3% threshold,
to achieve the goal of the admission to the Monetary Union. From 1997 on, they might
have wanted to avoid the sanctions implied by the Pact. These eﬀects would be captured
by an estimated positive (and signiﬁcant) ψ. In models (6) and (7) emu has been com-
puted by using revised data of deﬁcit-GDP ratios whereas real-time data of this indicator
are used in models (8) and (9).20
For each of the models presented above, two additional variables are constructed by
interacting x with a dummy indicator which equals one when the output gap is positive
(negative), and zero otherwise. Then, to capture possible asymmetries in the way ﬁscal
policy reacts to the economic cycle, these regressors (deﬁned as “negative” and “positive”
output gaps) are included separately in the proposed ﬁscal rules, where the associated
coeﬃcients are β1 and β2.
The panel speciﬁcation underlying the proposed regression models implies that policy-
makers in OECD countries behave uniformly, as far as reactions to output ﬂuctuations and
20Models (8) and (9) incorporate real-time values for the debt variable since, albeit some changes in
accounting standards used to measure public liabilities have occurred over the considered period, dt−1|t−1
is the level of the debt to GDP ratio actually observed by policymakers in period t − 1. However, as it
will be shown later, the use of revised data for d rather than real-time ones does not aﬀect the results
considerably.20
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debt dynamics are concerned. Therefore, β and θ gauge, respectively, the common-across-
countries “cyclical sensitivity” and “sustainability concern” of ﬁscal authorities.21 Such a
homogeneity assumption is made necessary to avoid degree-of-freedom-related problems
in estimation, although it cannot be discarded that ﬁscal authorities may follow (at least
partially) diﬀerent reaction functions. However, a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel model approach has
the advantage that possible (unobserved) heterogeneities in the conduct of ﬁscal policy are
captured by the coeﬃcients αi.
Table 4 reports FE-LS estimates of model (6) through (9).22 Column 1 and 2 display
the results when only ex-post data are used in the regressions. The cyclical sensitivity
parameter estimate is -0.15 and it is highly signiﬁcant, pointing to pro-cyclicality in the
ex-post ﬁscal policy stance, consistently with most of the literature using revised data.
This holds in particular during economic upturns, whereas ˆ β1 signals an acyclical stance
during downturns.
When real-time values of the output gap are employed, ˆ β becomes insigniﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero, suggesting acyclicality, whereas ˆ θ remains positive but it is more precisely
estimated (column 3 and 4). The introduction of real-time information on the debt indi-
cator and on deﬁcit-GDP ratios used to computed the emu dummy variable does not alter
the picture much, except that the ˆ ψ turns signiﬁcant (Columns 5 and 6). This suggests
that, in the years preceding and following the adoption of the single currency, EMU coun-
tries have attempted to reduce deﬁcits (the capb rises) when these have exceeded the 3%
ceiling.
When the one-year-ahead forecasts of the capb and the current-year estimates of it
are used in the regression, results radically change. In particular, ˆ β reverts its sign and
becomes signiﬁcantly (at the 10% level) positive, signalling counter-cyclicality, as shown
in Column 7. The “unconditional” cyclical sensitivity of the budget authority (i.e. β)
can be thought as a (weighted) average of the cyclical sensitivities, conditional on positive
and negative phases of the business cycle. Then, as results in Column 8 indicate, a very
strong counter-cyclical reaction during expansions plays a key role in explaining the positive
ˆ β, whereas ﬁscal policy seems to remain acyclical in recessions. In particular, during
upturns, a one percentage point increase of the output gap induces a 0.24 percentage point
21In this framework, a positive β indicates a “counter-cyclical” discretionary stance, since the capb
increases during expansions (the so-called “saving for rainy days” policies) and drops during slowdowns.
T h ep o l i c ys t a n c ei sd e ﬁ n e da s“ p r o - c y c l i c a l ”i fβ is negative, as discretionary ﬁscal policy decisions tend to
exacerbate ﬂuctuations in the economic cycle. In addition, the policy is characterized as “sustainable” when
θ is positive and “unsustainable” when it is negative. In the former case, in fact, taxes are discretionarily
increased and public spending reduced when debt dynamics are explosive. In the latter, discretionary
policies contribute to worsen the state of public ﬁnance by increasing the debt-output ratio.
22As well known, Least Squared estimators are asymptotically consistent for T large in dynamic panels
(see Nickell (1981)). Moreover, compared to Instrumental Variables (IV) methods, results are not depen-
dant on the choice of instruments. Nevertheless, as robustness checks, IV estimates are also shown in
Section 5.21
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(planned) ﬁscal tightening. Interestingly, the ex-ante behavior of ﬁscal authorities does
not appear to be characterized by a “sustainability concern” related to the level of public
indebtedness, as generally found in papers using revised data (see e.g. Bohn (1998) and
European Commission (2004)), since ˆ θ is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. It is also
worth noticing that persistence in ﬁscal planning plays a key role in accounting for capb s
dynamics, as documented by ˆ ρ being highly signiﬁcant and close to one. Finally, the R2
of the “fully-real-time” regression is remarkably higher compared to ones of models (6)
through (8), thereby indicating the appropriateness of this speciﬁcation when the interest
is on the intentional ﬁscal policy stance.23
4.4 Multiple regimes in ﬁscal policy
The issue of whether ﬁscal policy behaves asymmetrically along the business cycle has been
addressed in the previous Section by relying on the notion of “good times” as periods of
positive output gaps and “bad” ones as years in which the actual output was below the
potential one. The same approach is followed by many other papers on ﬁscal policy rules
(see e.g. Gavin and Perotti (1997), European Commission (2004) and OECD (2003)).
Some authors have however suggested that the “true” functional relation linking the
ﬁscal policy indicator to the state of the economy might have an alternative form, implying
that a switch in the policy behavior may occur around other phases of the cycle, for exam-
ple when the output gap exceeds a certain threshold level (diﬀerent from zero). Moreover,
the conduct of ﬁscal policy may be characterized by more than two regimes. In particular,
Manasse (2005) suggests that the cyclical sensitivity of ﬁscal policy may vary when slow-
downs are particularly severe and upturns strong, compared to intermediate states of the
business cycle.24
23On the cyclical response of ﬁscal policy, Galì and Perotti (2003), using the (then-available) ex-post
data from the December 2002 OECD Economic Outlook, argue that the stance of ﬁscal policy has been
a-cyclical in EMU countries, and counter-cyclical in OECD non-EMU ones, over the 1992-2001 period. The
vintage of data used in that work, and in particular its proximity to the 1999-2000 expansion, may help
to reconcile Galì and Perotti’s (2003) ﬁndings with the ones of this paper. In fact, the 1999-2000 upturn
was characterized by large downward revision of potential outputs, and upward revision of output gaps,
even several years after the ﬁrst releases of data. It can be argued that, with hindsight, the data employed
by Galì and Perotti (2003) may be considered as “quasi-real-time” relative to the 1999-2000 expansion, as
they are to some extent closer to our “real-time” than to our “revised” ones. In fact, data released in 2002
for the 1999-2000 period have been revised further, and heavily, after 2002. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the authors ﬁnd some evidence of counter-cyclicality, although they made no distinction between
intentional and realized stance. At the same time, and with the perspective of today, the use of revised
data (as from the December 2006 OECD Economic Outlook) speaks strongly in favor of pro-cyclicality.
In particular, it can be shown that, based on the estimation of a ﬁscal policy rule as equation 6 (which
is virtually equivalent to the one proposed by Galì and Perotti (2003)), the ﬁscal stance is gauged to be
signiﬁcantly pro-cyclical not only for the whole 19-countries sample, but also considering separately EMU
and OECD non-EMU country groups.
24The author ﬁnds that, in a Barro-Gordon type of framework, and in the presence of limits on the deﬁcit
to GDP ratio, ﬁscal policy should be pro-cyclical during moderate economic downturns and counter-cyclical
in more severe recessions. During mild slowdowns, in fact, governments are more likely to implement
tightening measures to avoid exceeding the deﬁcit limit thereby triggering a further reduction in economic
growth. During very “bad” economic times, on the contrary, the cost of abiding is too high and they ﬁnd
it optimal to brake the deﬁcit rule and operate counter-cyclically through expansive policies.22
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Threshold eﬀects may be also at play as regards the response of ﬁscal policy to the level
of government debt. In the framework of the European Monetary Union and the Stability
and Growth Pact, for instance, ﬁscal authorities may pursue more sustainable policies,
attempting to reduce public debts, when the 60% ceiling is approached or exceeded. More
in general, it can be expected that governments are more concerned about the sustainability
of public ﬁnances when the public debt is high rather than when it is low. Hence, the
relation linking the discretionary component of ﬁscal policy to debt developments might
be non-constant, possibly switching around a certain threshold level of the debt indicator.
Based on Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold model, and within a ﬁscal policy reaction
function framework, here we test whether these threshold eﬀects are statistically relevant
and whether the way ﬁscal policy is conducted might be characterized by a multiplicity of
regimes.
Hansen’s (1999) model is taken as a guideline as it does not rely on an “ad-hoc” split
of the data (as, for example, it is done when positive and negative output gaps are treated
separately). Instead, it allows to endogenously identify, through a minimization criterion,
single (or multiple) thresholds where a regime shift is more likely to occur (in a statistical
sense). Furthermore, a bootstrap technique is proposed to assess the statistical signiﬁcance
of threshold eﬀects, and an asymptotic theory (with ﬁxed T as N →∞ )i su s e dt od r a w
valid inference on parameters in diﬀerent regimes.25 Hansen’s (1999) model has been
developed for non-dynamic balanced panels. In Appendix B we recall the key lines of that
work, and we propose a two-stage procedure that allows applications to dynamic panel
models.
Possible non-linear reactions to cyclical developments and to the debt dynamics are
modeled separately, as the approach proposed by Hansen (1999) does not allow to nest
in the same framework threshold identiﬁcation for two diﬀerent variables. First, we test
whether the capb may respond diﬀerently to the real activity conditional on the level of the
output gap, and assuming that the reaction to the debt to GDP ratio is constant. Secondly,
and symmetrically, the capb is allowed to react non-linearly to the debt indicator, keeping
the sensitivity to the output gap invariant. In particular, as concerns the former test, our
25The choice of the methodological strategy used is also dictated by the particular type of non-linearity
we are interested in (threshold eﬀects) and by the panel structure of the dataset. A related application, but
in a time series framework, is Favero and Monacelli (2005) which employs the Hamilton’s (1989) regime
switching model to the estimation of quarterly ﬁscal rules for the U.S. economy. They ﬁnd that ﬁscal
policy might be characterized as “active” (i.e. ﬁscal policymakers promote discretionary policies aiming
at stabilizing output ﬂuctuations) from the 1960s throughout the 1980s, then as “passive” (i.e. ﬁscal
authorities are concerned about debt developments only) during the 1990s and “active” again since the
start of the G. W. Bush Administration.23
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approach will allow to select one of the following models
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1
+βxi,t−1|t−1 + θdi,t−1|t−1 + ψemu i,t−1|t−1 + εi,t; (10)
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1
+β1xi,t−1|t−1I(xi,t−1|t−1 ≤ γx)
+β2xi,t−1|t−1I(xi,t−1|t−1 >γ x)+θdi,t−1|t−1 + ψemu i,t−1|t−1 + εi,t; (11)
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1
+β1xi,t−1|t−1I(xi,t−1|t−1 ≤ γ1,x)
+β2xi,t−1|t−1I(γ1,x <x i,t−1|t−1 ≤ γ2,x)
+β3xi,t−1|t−1I(γ2,x <x i,t−1|t−1)+θdi,t−1|t−1 + ψemu i,t−1|t−1 + εi,t; (12)
where equation (10) is characterized by a single regime (linear ﬁscal policy rule), equa-
tion (11) by two regimes (single threshold rule) and equation (12) by three regimes (double
threshold rule) in the way discretionary ﬁscal policies counteract the economic cycle. In
this framework, γx is the (unknown) threshold level associated with the output gap in
the two-regimes model, γ1,x and γ2,x the two (unknown) thresholds in the three-regimes
model.26
Further, possible non-linear reactions to public debt dynamics are tested based on the
estimation of the following equations
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1 + βxi,t−1|t−1
+θdi,t−1|t−1 + ψemu i,t−1|t−1 + εi,t; (13)
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1 + βxi,t−1|t−1
+θ1di,t−1|t−1I(di,t−1|t−1 ≤ γd)
+θ2di,t−1|t−1I(di,t−1|t−1 >γ d)+ψemu i,t−1|t−1 + εi,t; (14)
capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1 + βxi,t−1|t−1
+θ1di,t−1|t−1I(di,t−1|t−1 ≤ γd,1)
+θ2di,t−1|t−1I(γd,1 <d i,t−1|t−1 ≤ γd,2)
+θ3di,t−1|t−1I(γd,2 <d i,t−1|t−1)+ψemu i,t−1|t−1 + εi,t; (15)
26Hansen’s (1999) approach can be virtually extended to models incorporating more than two thresholds.
Here at most two thresholds are considered, since it is unlikely that the discretionary behavior of ﬁscal
authorities is characterized by more than three regimes.24
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where γd is the (unknown) threshold level associated with the debt ratio in the single
threshold model, γ1,d and γ2,d the two (unknown) thresholds in the double threshold model.
The notation in equations (10) through (15) refers to the “fully-real-time” case, since
only ex-ante data are employed. However, tests will be also performed employing revised
data for all the variables included given that, as documented before, any assessment on
the stance of ﬁscal policy seems to heavily depend on whether ex-ante or ex-post data are
used. Firstly, a “backward-looking” speciﬁcation (henceforth BL) of the ﬁscal policy rule
is proposed, including lagged observations (revised data) and current-year estimates (real-
time data) of output gaps, i.e. xi,t−1 and xi,t−1|t−1. In addition, as as robustness exercise,
tests will be also carried out based on a “forward-looking” speciﬁcation (henceforth FL),
incorporating contemporaneous observations (revised data) and one-year-ahead forecasts
(real-time data) of x,i . e . xi,t and xi,t|t−1.27 As in the previous Sections, the sample
includes 19 OECD countries, spanning the period 1994 to 2006.
For sake of space, the testing procedure is laid out in Appendix B. Here we just recall
that the likelihood ratio statistics F1 and F2 are respectively used to test the linear model
(i.e. equations (10) and (13)) against the single threshold one (i.e. equations (11) and
(14)), and the single threshold model against the double threshold one (i.e. equations (12)
and (15)). The likelihood ratio test LR1 is employed to construct conﬁdence intervals
around the estimated ˆ γx and ˆ γd in single threshold models.
Table 5 reports the F1 and F2 statistics, along with their p-values constructed from
5000 bootstrap replications, used to test whether the reaction of the capb to the output gap
is constant over the business cycle or varies in diﬀerent phases of it. The results in Column
1 and 2, based on real-time data, suggest that the null of no threshold eﬀects is rejected
at the 10% level when a BL rule is considered and at 5% level when the one-year-ahead
output gap is used as threshold variable (FL speciﬁcation). The presence of three regimes
is however rejected, as indicated by the p-values associated with the F2 statistics. This
suggests that a single threshold ﬁscal reaction function (as equation (10)) should be the
appropriate model for analyzing the ex-ante cyclical stance of ﬁscal policy.
The estimated ˆ γx is in the negative region, respectively equal to -1.2 in the BL case
and to -1.8 in the FL one. However, the relatively large 68% and 95% conﬁdence intervals
constructed around these estimates generally include positive, and low, values of the output
gap. Hence, the threshold might be equally located during mild upturns and slowdowns of
the business cycle. Table 6 presents the ˆ β1 and ˆ β2 “regime-dependent” regression estimates
suggesting that, broadly in line with results reported in Column 7 and 8 of Table 4, the
ﬁscal policy stance seems neutral when the output gap is below the threshold, whereas
strongly and signiﬁcantly counter-cyclical when it is above it.
27The use of contemporaneous data and one-year-ahead forecasts of the output gap in the FL rule may
induce an endogeneity problem, since these indicator might be aﬀected by ﬁscal measures planned for the
same year. Although IV estimators should be employed in this case, for simplicity and consistency with
the BL exercise we follow Hansen’s (1999) model which has been developed based on LS methods.25
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These ﬁndings indicate that asymmetric eﬀects seem to be at play as long as the
intentional behavior of ﬁscal policy is considered, and that it is reasonable to model a
switch in the policy stance as occurring when the actual output is close to the potential
one. By contrast, when the estimation is based on revised data, the low values of the
F1 statistic, reported in Column 3 and 4 of Table 5, imply that we cannot discriminate
between diﬀerent regimes in the behavior of ﬁscal policy, if analyzed ex-post.
The results on the possible presence of non-linear eﬀects in the discretionary ﬁscal
policy response to movements in government debt are reported in Table 7. The estimated
F1 statistics strongly point to a rejection of threshold eﬀects, no matter whether real-
time or revised data are used in the estimation.28 It is however interesting to note that,
as Figure 4 shows for the “fully-real-time” case and the BL speciﬁcation, the likelihood
ratio LR1 is minimized when the threshold variable is at 98.3%. When this threshold is
used in the estimation, the ˆ θ1 and ˆ θ2 “regime-dependent” regression slopes, representing the
discretionary response of ﬁscal policy to debt when this is below (above) the threshold level
(see equation (14)), are equal to 0.0116 and 0.0028 respectively. The former is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level while the latter is statistically insigniﬁcant. This would imply that, over the
last thirteen years, governments have reacted in a more sustainable way to the accumulation
of public debt when its level was relatively low.29
5 Robustness checks
Table 8 presents the results from some robustness exercises. The benchmark estimates of
the “fully-real-time” ﬁscal rule (from Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4) are reported in Columns
1a n d2 .
In the ﬁrst experiment, since estimates of the output gap depend upon the speciﬁc
methodology employed to compute the potential output, and given that the OECD follows
a “production function” approach (see Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare and van den Noord
(1995)), we propose an alternative real-time measure of the output gap based on the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. For each country i and each vintage t (from 1994 to 2006), we
reconstruct real GDP series, in levels, and we compute the output gap by following these
steps:30
28Since values of the general government public debt based on the notion of gross ﬁnancial liabilities
may partially diﬀer from the ones based on the “Maastricht deﬁnition” of it, we also test for threshold
eﬀects when this latter indicator is used. The hypothesis of multiple regimes is again rejected, both in
the real-time and the revised case (results not shown, available from the author). A still unexplored but
possibly promising alternative approach could be the one of testing whether governments react non-linearly
to implicit liabilities.
29As far as EMU countries are concerned, this would also indicate that the reaction has been weaker
when the 60% limit has been (largely) exceeded, suggesting that the “dissuasive arm” of the Stability and
Growth Pact failed to encourage more virtuous policies when the level of public debt was particularly high.
30Note that the OECD Economic Outlook does not report data on real GDP in levels, but just in terms
of growth rates.26
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1. The available observations on real GDP growth rates from year t1 = t − Tstart to
year t2 = t + Tend are collected;31
2. We normalize at 100 the ﬁrst value of real GDP in levels, corresponding to year
t0 = t1−1. All the remaining observations are computed by recursively applying the
annual GDP growth rates;
3. A trend in the (reconstructed) GDP series in levels is estimated by the Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter, with a smoothing parameter set equal to 100;
4. The new real-time output gap for year t, deﬁned as x
hp
i,t|t, is computed as deviation
of GDP from the value of the trend estimated for the same year. Series of positive
(negative) output gaps are constructed by interacting x
hp
i,t|t with a dummy variable
equal to one when x
hp
i,t|t > 0 (x
hp
i,t|t ≤ 0), and zero otherwise.
The results laid out in Column 3 show that, when this real-time measure of the output
gap is used in the regressions, the estimated coeﬃcient representing the cyclical sensitivity
of ﬁscal policy is 0.11, and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. When upswings and slowdowns
are considered separately, the estimated slopes point to counter-cyclicality during buoyant
economic times, whereas the policy stance appears to be neutral when output is below the
estimated long-run level.
Next, we use a diﬀerent indicator of cyclical conditions, represented by real GDP growth
rates (as percentage change from previous years), measured in real-time, replacing the
output gap. The underlying idea is that policymakers might not be able to compute the
potential output, or might not want to rely on such an uncertain indicator in designing
their policies, and may respond only to the output growth as a measure of real activity.
The positive and 99% signiﬁcant ˆ β in Column 5 points to counter-cyclicality, as in the
benchmark case. Then, positive and negative “growth gaps” are included as separate
exogenous variables. These regressors are constructed by removing individual means from
the real-time GDP growth rate series for each country i. Positive (negative) growth gaps
are derived by multiplying the demeaned series, named gdpi,t|t, by an indicator function
which takes value one (zero) when gdpi,t|t > 0, and zero (one) otherwise. It emerges that
the ﬁscal policy stance seems counter-cyclical when growth is above its average, whereas
acyclical in the opposite case.
Furthermore, a forward looking speciﬁcation of the ﬁscal rule is estimated, where the
one-year-ahead forecast of the output gap (as published by the OECD) is included as
measure of real activity (Column 7 and 8). This is consistent with the possibility that ﬁscal
policy authorities may react to expected cyclical conditions, rather than current ones. In
31T
start and T
end deﬁne the data span available in each edition of the Economic Outlook. T
start is set
equal to 16 for vintages up to 2002 and to 13 for the ones from 2003 to 2006. T
end is 2 since the Economic
Outlook reports the one-year-ahead and two-years-ahead forecasts of real GDP growth rates.27
ECB
Working Paper Series No 919
July 2008
this case, an endogeneity bias in estimation may occur, stemming from a possible inverse
causality between the capb and the cyclical indicator. Hence, regression estimates are based
on an IV approach where the instruments used are the current-year estimate of the output
gap for year t−1 (xi,t−1|t−1)a n dt h et−1 current-year output gap (unweighted) averages
over all the OECD countries considered, other than country i. The Sargan test suggests
that the over-identifying restrictions induced by the proposed instruments are valid, both
in “unconditional” case and in the “conditional” one. The estimates shown in Column
7 indicate that the unconditional reaction to cyclical ﬂuctuations is counter-cyclical and
close to the benchmark backward looking parameter reported in Column 1. Moreover,
ﬁscal authorities seem to respond very asymmetrically to expected upturns and slowdowns
in the economic cycle as indicated by a ˆ β2 coeﬃcient equal to 0.37, and signiﬁcant at a 1%
level, and a ˆ β1 slope close to zero and insigniﬁcant (Column 8).
Finally, we control for the possibility that the “political cycle” may play an important
role in shaping the behavior of ﬁscal authorities, as suggested by Buti and van den Noord
(2004). The benchmark regression (equation (9)) is augmented by a dummy variable
taking value of one in parliamentary election years and zero otherwise.32 As Column
9 and 10 show, the coeﬃcient associated with this regressor is weakly signiﬁcant but
of the expected negative sign indicating that the occurrence of an election may lead to
more ﬁscal proﬂigacy, thereby reducing public savings. The sign and the size of all the
other coeﬃcients are however not importantly aﬀected suggesting that the inclusion of this
additional exogenous variable does not seem to be relevant in the assessment of the cyclical
behavior of ﬁscal policy.
6 Conclusions
This paper has shown that, in ﬁscal policy analysis, realistic assumptions about the time-
liness at which information is available to policymakers are of key importance. When the
object of interest is the intentional stance of ﬁscal policy, real-time observations of the
operating instrument used by ﬁscal policymakers should be employed in the estimation of
ﬁscal policy rules. We demonstrate that the sign and the size of the bias incurred in esti-
mating a ﬁscal rule on revised data, when an ex-ante relation is under investigation, can
be accurately predicted based on empirical covariances among measurement errors, and on
other second-order moments. In particular, our ﬁndings suggest that the use of updated
observations would point to a pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy stance in industrialized countries
over the 1994-2006 period, whereas real-time data indicate that ﬁscal policy was intended
to be counter-cyclical, especially as long as economic expansions are concerned.
Further, formal tests based on Hansen (1999) are performed to explore whether the
32Data on election years are taken from the website of the International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (http://www.idea.int/vt/parl.cfm) and from the Election Resources on the Internet
website (http://electionresources/org).28
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discretionary behavior of ﬁscal policy might have been characterized by multiple regimes.
It emerges that a switch in the intentional ﬁscal policy stance, from neutral (or slightly
pro-cyclical) to counter-cyclical, is likely to occur when output is around its equilibrium
level. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the use of revised data does not allow to identify
any signiﬁcant threshold eﬀect in the cyclical conduct of ﬁscal policy. Multiple regimes are
always rejected as regards the response of ﬁscal policy to debt accumulation, both when
real-time or revised data are used in the estimation.
Overall, these ﬁndings cast doubts on the eﬀectiveness of discretionary ﬁscal policies to
ﬁne tune the business cycle. In fact, albeit the intentional stance of the policy seems to be
genuinely counter-cyclical, ex-post we ﬁnd a pro-cyclical behavior. This suggests that the
long and uncertain lags behind the budgetary process, coupled with diﬃculties in correctly
measuring the output gap at the time of budgeting, have probably prevented stabilizing
ﬁscal measures to be timely implemented over the economic cycle.29
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A Appendix: Revision errors in the dependent variable and
inconsistency of Fixed-Eﬀects Least-Squares estimators.
This Appendix shows that in a simple bivariate panel regression framework the FE-LS
estimator is inconsistent, when both the dependent variable y and the regressor z are
contaminated by measurement errors, and under the condition that these measurement
errors are cross-correlated. The analytical form of the asymptotic bias is derived.
Let the scalars yi,t|t and zi,t|t denote the “true” values of the variable y and x.C l e a r l y ,i n
this setup, the notation used suggests that the true values correspond to the observations
available in “real-time”. The structural equation of interest is the following
yi,t|t = αi + βzi,t|t + εi,t,i =1 ,...,N;t =1 ,...,T, (A.1)
where εi,t ∼ i.i.d(0,σ2
ε). Suppose that the variables yi,t|t and zi,t|t are not actually observed.
Instead, the “revised” data yi,t and zi,t are observed and used to estimate β,w h e r e
yi,t = yi,t|t + ν
y
i,t, (A.2)















j,t)=0 , for i  = j; i,j ∈ [1,N], (A.6)
Cov(zi,t|t,νz
j,t)=0 , for i  = j; i,j ∈ [1,N]. (A.7)
























with non-zero (possibly diﬀerent across groups) means and contemporaneous cross-covariances
assumed to be diﬀerent from zero (σνzνy  =0 ). Furthermore, the measurement errors in
y and z are allowed to be correlated across groups: Cov(νyi,νzj)=σνyiν
zj = σνyνz,
33Notice that in the present framework the relationship between the correct values and “fallible” obser-
vations is reversed compared to the conventional approach, since here the interest is on real-time data.34
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∀i,j ∈ [1,N]. Note that we do not introduce any assumption on auto-correlation of mea-
surement errors since this does not aﬀect the derivation of the asymptotic bias, as spelled
out more in detail below.
Rearranging (A.2) and (A.3) as yi,t|t = yi,t − ν
y
i,t and zi,t|t = zi,t − νz
i,t and substituting
these expressions into (A.1) we obtain
yi,t − ν
y
i,t = αi + β(zi,t − νz
i,t)+εi,t. (A.9)




t wi,t for w = y,z,νy,νz;f r o m( A . 9 )w eg e t
¯ yi − ¯ ν
y
i = αi + β(¯ zi − ¯ νz
i )+εi,t − ¯ εi. (A.10)
Subtracting (A.10) from (A.9), and recalling that εi,t has zero mean, gives
(yi,t − ¯ yi) − (ν
y
i,t − ¯ ν
y
i )=β[(zi,t − ¯ zi) − (νz
i,t − ¯ νz
i )] + εi,t. (A.11)
These NT equations can be expressed as follows
˜ yi,t = β˜ zi,t +˜ ν
y
i,t − β˜ νz
i,t − εi,t, (A.12)
where the notation ˜ wi,t = wi,t − ¯ wi (for w = y,z,νy,νz) denotes demeaned values. The
FE-LS estimator of β is obtained by pooling across the groups i the demeaned equations
in (A.12) and applying ordinary least squares.
Stacking the equations in (A.12) we get
˜ y = β˜ z + ˜ vy − β˜ vz + e, (A.13)
where ˜ y,˜ z,˜ vy,˜ vz and e are (NT × 1) column vectors. Deﬁning ˜ y∗ and ˜ z∗ the (NT × 1)
column vectors obtained by stacking the (demeaned) true values of y and x,f r o m( A . 2 )






with τ =1 ,...,NT, the scalars from the vectors ˜ y,˜ z,˜ y∗,˜ z∗,˜ vy,˜ vz we may write (subscripts
are dropped for simplicity)
˜ y =˜ y∗ +˜ νy, (A.14)
˜ z =˜ z∗ +˜ νz. (A.15)














˜ νy σ˜ νy˜ νz
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˜ z ˜ z)=σ2





˜ z ˜ vz)=σ2
˜ νz,
where plim is the probability limit, for N →∞and T →∞ .F r o m( A . 1 3 ) ,a n du n d e r
the assumption plim( 1
NT˜ z e)=0 , the FE-LS estimator of β is obtained as
ˆ β =( ˜ z ˜ z)−1˜ z ˜ y. (A.17)
To check for consistency, we take the probability limit of β
plim(ˆ β)=plim((˜ z ˜ z)−1˜ z ˜ y)




˜ z∗ + σ2
˜ νz
(σ˜ νz˜ νy − βσ2
˜ νz). (A.18)
From (A.18) it can be concluded that the FE-LS estimator applied to revised data gives
inconsistent results, when the parameter of interest is β in (A.1). The asymptotic bias
will depend not only on measurement errors in z, but also on the covariance between
measurement errors in the dependent variable y and in z.34
Assuming that the true value for β is known, it will be possible to predict the sign
and the size of this bias by computing the empirical variance ˆ σ2
˜ νz and covariance ˆ σ˜ νz˜ νy (in
addition to the ˆ σ2
˜ ν∗ and ˆ σ2
˜ νz terms at the denominator). Equation (A.18) encompasses the
standard textbook case since, when σ˜ νz˜ νy =0 , the consistency of the FE-LS estimator is
only inﬂuenced by measurement errors in z, whereas measurement errors in y will aﬀect
just the estimator variance.
34Autocorrelation in revision errors in y and z may also be explicitly introduced, for instance by assuming
that ν
y and ν












t, where ρνy  =0 ,































σ˜ ηz ˜ ηy







Yet, the exercise illustrated in Section 4.2 is based on (A.18) given that the empirical counterparts of
σ
2
˜ νz,σ˜ νz˜ νy and σ
2
˜ νz in that equation already incorporate possible autocorrelation in revisions. In addition,
the use of (A.19) would imply that ﬁve more parameters need to be estimated.36
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Albeit computationally more demanding, the analytical form of the asymptotic bias can
still be derived when two or more regressors are included into the equation. Even without
a formal derivation, it can be argued that relying on data contaminated by measurement
errors will yield inconsistent estimates, unless the covariances between all measurement
errors cancel out.37
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B Appendix: A threshold panel regression model
This Appendix illustrates the main building blocks of the panel threshold model by Hansen
(1999), before proposing a two-stage procedure for applications to dynamic panels. The
single threshold model and the double threshold one will be presented.
B.1 The single threshold model
Let yit,z it and qit be data from a balanced panel with i =1 ,...,N and t =1 ,...,T.
Deﬁning I(·) the indicator function and μi the individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the (unobserved)
structural equation linking the dependent variable yit to the regressor zit might be
yi,t = αi + βzit + εi,t, (B.1)
or
yi,t = αi + β1zitI(qit ≤ γ)+β2zitI(qit >γ )+εi,t, (B.2)
with ei,t ∼ i.i.d(0,σ2
e), depending on whether the relation between yi,t and zi,t changes
when qi,t exceeds a certain threshold γ. The model developed by Hansen (1999) allows to
test the null hypothesis of no threshold eﬀects
H0 : β1 = β2.
Furthermore, if H0 is rejected, inference on the threshold parameter is provided by
testing
˜ H0 : γ = γ0,
where γ0 is the “true” threshold. Hansen’s (1999) procedure for estimation and inference
in single threshold models follows these main steps:
1. The observations on the threshold variable qit are grouped across individuals and
time, and sorted in ascending (or descending) order. From the (NT × 1) resulting
q vector, select M distinct values q1 ...q M, after discarding the smallest and largest
η%,f o rs o m eη>0. These are the values used to search for ˆ γ.35 For each qj (or γj),
perform the within transformation of equations (B.2).36 The demeaned equations
are stacked and estimated by OLS. Deﬁning ˜ e(γ) the vector of regression errors
and S1(γ)=˜ e(γ) ˜ e(γ) the concentrated sum of squared errors; the threshold ˆ γ is
estimated by minimizing S1(γ) over all values of γ.T h a ti s ,
35For each experiment performed in Section 4.4, the trimming parameter η is ﬁxed to 22 to make sure
that at least 50 observations (  N × (T − 1) × η/100) lie in each regime.
36Hereafter γ is used for γj.38
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ˆ γ = argmin
γ
S1(γ). (B.3)
2. The H0 hypothesis of no threshold eﬀects is tested based on the likelihood ratio
statistic
F1 =( S0 − S1(ˆ γ))/ˆ σ2, (B.4)
where S0 is the sum of squared errors from the estimation of the linear model (B.1)
and ˆ σ2 is the estimated variance of residuals from model (B.2). The asymptotic
distribution of F1 is non-standard, hence a bootstrap procedure is proposed to derive
asymptotically valid critical values.
3. When H0 is rejected (i.e. when there is statistical evidence of a threshold eﬀect),
Hansen (2000) proves that ˆ γ is consistent for γ0. The likelihood ratio statistic given
by
LR1(γ)=( S1(γ) − S1(ˆ γ))/ˆ σ2, (B.5)
is used to test ˜ H0 : γ = γ0. The likelihood ratio test is to reject for large value of
LR1(γ0). Theorem 1 in Hansen (1999) shows that under certain assumptions and
˜ H0 : γ = γ0,
LR1(γ) →d ξ (B.6)
as n →∞where ξ is a random variable with distribution function
P(ξ ≤ x)=( 1− exp(−x/2))2. (B.7)
The asymptotic distribution in (B.6) is pivotal, and it may be used to construct
asymptotically valid conﬁdence intervals. The distribution function (B.7) has inverse
c(α)=−2log(1−
√
1 − α), from which critical values can be calculated (for instance,
the 1%, 5% and 32% critical values are 10.59, 7.35 and 3.48 respectively). Finally,
the “acceptance region” of conﬁdence level 1−α can be derived as that set of values
of γ for which LR1(γ) ≤ c(α). This can be visually seen by plotting LR1(γ) against
a ﬂat line at c(α).37
37The distribution of the slope coeﬃcient ˆ β = ˆ β(ˆ γ) depends on the threshold estimate ˆ γ. Hansen (2000)
demonstrates that the dependence on the threshold estimate is of second-order importance. Therefore,
ˆ β is asymptotically normal with covariance matrix estimated by ˆ V =( z(ˆ γ)
 z(ˆ γ))
−1ˆ σ
2, where z(ˆ γ) is the
vector of stacked regressors, after removing individual means.39
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B.2 The double threshold model
The “true” model may incorporate more than one threshold. In Hansen’s (1999) double
threshold model, the procedure for estimation and inference on threshold parameters is
more cumbersome, albeit intuitively similar, than what shown for the single threshold
model. The double threshold regression model reads as
yi,t = αi + β1zitI(qit ≤ γ1)+β2zitI(γ1 <q it ≤ γ2)+β3zitI(qit >γ 2)+εi,t, (B.8)
where γ2 >γ 1. Estimation, testing for double threshold eﬀects and conﬁdence intervals’
constructions are performed as follows:
1. A sequential method is used to consistently estimate the γ1 and γ2 thresholds. First,
estimate γ1 as in step 1 of the single threshold model. A ﬁrst-stage estimate ˆ γ1 is










S(ˆ γ1,γ 2) if ˆ γ1 <γ 2
S(γ2, ˆ γ1) if γ2 < ˆ γ1
(B.10)
As shown in Bai (1997), ˆ γr
2 is asymptotically eﬃcient but ˆ γ1 is not. Then, a third-










S(γ1, ˆ γ2) if γ1 < ˆ γr
2
S(ˆ γr
2,γ 1) if ˆ γr
2 <γ 1
(B.12)
2. To discriminate between one or two thresholds, and deﬁning Sr
2(ˆ γr
2) and ˆ σ2 =
Sr
2(ˆ γr
2)/n(T − 1) the sum of squared errors and the estimated variance of second-
stage residuals respectively; an approximate likelihood ratio test is proposed based
on
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As before, the asymptotic distribution of F2 is non-standard and Hansen (1999)
develops a bootstrap procedure to construct appropriate critical values.














2(γ) are deﬁned by (B.10) and (B.12). The “no-rejection” regions
a r et h es e to fv a l u e so fγ such that LRr
1 ≤ c(α) and LRr
2 ≤ c(α).
B.3 A two-stage procedure applied to Hansen (1999)
The methodology proposed by Hansen (1999) has been developed for non-dynamic panel
models and it cannot be automatically applied to dynamic ones. In a ﬁscal policy reaction
function framework, however, a potential problem may stem from the inclusion of one (or
more) lagged term of the dependent variable. In particular, this holds for models (10)
through (15), when revised-data are used in estimation (see also equations (6) through
(8)). At the same time, using real-time variables implies that these models are not properly
dynamic, since the dependent variable is the one-year-ahead capb forecast (capbt|t−1) while
the current-year-estimate of the capb (capbt−1|t−1) is included in the right-hand-side of the
equation. However, these two terms are likely to be highly correlated.
Hence, we propose a two-stage procedure to address this issue. In the following, the
procedure for the single threshold model is presented. The same approach applies for the
double threshold model (not shown).
Let the dynamic panel model of interest be represented by
yi,t = αi + ρyi,t−1 + βzit + εi,t, (B.16)
where the variable notation is the same above, and where ρ is the autoregressive coeﬃ-
cient associated with the lagged dependent variable yi,t−1. The procedure consists of these
two steps:
1. In the ﬁrst-stage, ρ is estimated from equation (B.16) by FE-LS;
2. In the second-stage, the single threshold model is tested against the linear one fol-
lowing the steps laid out in Section B.1, but equations B.1 and B.2 are modiﬁed
as41
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yi,t = αi +ˆ ρyi,t−1 + βzit + εi,t, (B.17)
and
yi,t = αi +ˆ ρyi,t−1 + β1zitI(qit ≤ γ)+β2zitI(qit >γ )+εi,t, (B.18)
where ˆ ρ is treated as known.38 Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic F1 and LR1 are
used to test H0 and ˜ H0.39
38In the exercises carried out in Section 4.4, the ﬁrst-stage regression parameters ˆ ρ are equal to 0.85 and
0.70 in the real-time and revised data case respectively.
39Notice that the two-stage procedure presented here should take into account the uncertainty stemming
from the estimation of ρ from the ﬁrst-stage. As a consequence, conﬁdence intervals from the second-stage
should be corrected accordingly. Nevertheless, we treat ˆ ρ as known. In the empirical application of Section
4.4, the fact that ˆ ρ is very precisely estimated, both in the BL and the FL case, as shown in Table 4, suggests
that the impact of this choice on the ﬁnal estimates is of second-order importance. In fact, replacing the
ﬁrst-stage (point) estimate with the upper and lower bounds associated with the 95% conﬁdence around
ˆ ρ1 does not aﬀect results considerably (estimates available from the author).42
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Table 1: Mean absolute value of revision errors








Germany 1.15 1.12 0.76 2.34
Belgium 0.68 0.64 0.46 3.40
Austria 1.13 0.79 0.97 3.85
Finland 2.51 1.25 1.30 5.38
Spain 0.66 0.58 0.78 3.83
Greece 0.73 2.94 2.83 13.59
Ireland 1.61 2.12 1.32 4.39
Italy 1.82 1.82 1.44 6.55
France 0.58 0.67 0.62 2.22
Netherlands 0.76 1.20 1.08 6.95
Portugal 1.30 1.56 1.23 4.63
Sweden 1.20 1.72 1.26 4.70
Denmark 0.75 1.18 0.96 6.19
UK 0.81 1.26 0.75 6.33
Norway 1.23 2.77 2.09 9.16
US 1.18 1.65 0.71 4.25
Canada 0.80 1.21 0.88 5.19
Japan 2.18 1.51 1.25 11.82
Australia 0.78 1.18 1.08 2.95
Mean 1.16 1.43 1.15 5.67
Source: Author own calculations based on the December Edi-
tions of the OECD Economic Outlook, from Number 56 to 80.






i,t are the re-
visions errors in the current-year estimates of the capb,x and d
respectively. ν
capb
1,i,t is the revision error in the one-year-ahead
forecasts of the capb. Entries in the Table are the mean ab-




T |w|,w h e r et =1
corresponds to the ﬁrst year of observation (1994) and T to the
end of the sample (2006). Values are in percentage points.43
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Germany -0.75 0.81 -0.06
Belgium -0.21 0.52 -0.29
Austria -0.69 0.76 -0.44
Finland -0.70 0.30 -0.03
Spain -0.71 0.84 0.14
Greece -0.58 0.75 -0.86
Ireland -0.39 0.77 -0.53
Italy -0.91 0.95 -0.43
France -0.55 0.74 0.07
Netherlands -0.68 0.83 -0.15
Portugal -0.65 0.63 -0.42
Sweden -0.64 0.84 -0.34
Denmark -0.67 0.77 -0.43
UK -0.69 0.85 0.32
Norway -0.30 0.88 0.07
US -0.52 0.92 0.69
Canada -0.44 0.66 0.72
Japan -0.83 0.86 0.22
Australia -0.36 0.62 -0.02
Mean -0.59 0.75 -0.09
Source: Author own calculations based on the De-
cember Editions of the OECD Economic Outlook,
from Number 56 (1994) to 80 (2006).
Note: Entries in the Table are ˆ ρ(ν
capb
1,i,t ,w):t h ee m -
pirical correlations between revision errors in the
one-year-ahead forecast of the capb and the revi-
sion errors in the current-year estimates (for year







i,t−1 (see Section (3)).44
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Table 3: Simple ﬁscal rule estimates:








R2 (within) 0.025 0.003 0.064
Observations 228 228 228
Countries 19 19 19
Notes: t statistic in italics. Estimation method: Fixed
eﬀects least squares. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.45
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Table 4: Estimates of the baseline ﬁscal policy rules: eﬀects of introducing real-time information.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Revised data: capb,x,d,emu capb,d,emu capb −
Real-time data: − x x,d,emu capb,x,d,emu
Dependent variable capbi,t capbi,t capbi,t capbi,t|t−1
Lagged dep.var. capbi,t−1 capbi,t−1 capbi,t−1 capbi,t−1|t−1
ˆ ρ 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.85*** 0.85***
16.21 15.99 16.00 15.96 16.38 16.36 34.88 35.31
Output gap xi,t−1 xi,t−1|t−1 xi,t−1|t−1 xi,t−1|t−1
ˆ β -0.15*** -0.07 -0.03 0.07*
-3.31 -1.16 -0.41 1.78
Negative output gap xi,t−1 ≤ 0 xi,t−1|t−1 ≤ 0 xi,t−1|t−1 ≤ 0 xi,t−1|t−1 ≤ 0
ˆ β1 -0.10 -0.04 0.04 -0.02
-1.50 -0.49 0.45 -0.42
Positive output gap xi,t−1 > 0 xi,t−1|t−1 > 0 xi,t−1|t−1 > 0 xi,t−1|t−1 > 0
ˆ β2 -0.26** -0.14 -0.15 0.24***
-2.48 -1.07 -1.19 3.23
Debt di,t−1 di,t−1 di,t−1|t−1 di,t−1|t−1
ˆ θ 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01
1.63 1.61 3.01 2.91 2.77 2.57 0.80 1.20
Dummy EMU emui,t−1 emui,t−1 emui,t−1|t−1 emui,t−1|t−1
ˆ ψ 0.11 0.13 0.29 0.32 0.66*** 0.74*** 0.47*** 0.35**
0.45 0.53 1.11 1.21 2.69 2.90 3.25 2.37
R2
Within 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.87 0.87
Between 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.99 0.99
Overall 0.82 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.95 0.95
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Source: author own calculations based on the December Issues of the OECD Economic Outlook from No. 56 to No. 80.
Notes: the estimated ﬁscal rules are equations (6), (7), (8) and (9), where positive and negative output gaps indicators are
omitted for simplicity in the baseline speciﬁcations. The notation x ≤ 0 (x>0) refer to the regressor constructed as I(x ≤ 0)x
(I(x>0)x)w h e r eI(·) is an indicator function taking value 1 when the output gap is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. t
statistics in italics. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Sample: 1994-2006. Estimation method:
Fixed Eﬀects Least Squares.46
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Table 5: Test for the number of thresholds in ﬁscal policy rules.
Threshold variable: output gap
Real-time data Revised data
BL FL BL FL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test for single threshold
F1 7.34 10.44 2.81 0.39
p-value 0.087 0.018 0.493 0.979
critical values:
10% 6.99 6.29 8.85 6.72
5% 9.00 7.98 11.78 8.56
1% 14.02 11.76 18.99 12.38







Notes: BL refers to the “backward looking” speciﬁcation where
xi,t−1|t−1 and xi,t−1 are used as threshold variables in the real-
time and revised data case respectively (Columns 1 and 3). FL
refers to the “forward looking” one where xi,t|t−1 and xi,t are used
(Columns 2 and 4). The autoregressive coeﬃcient from the ﬁrst-
stage regression, ˆ ρ1, is equal to 0.85 in the real-time data case
and to 0.70 in the revised data one. 5000 bootstrap replications
are used to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the F1 and
F2 likelihood ratio statistics.47
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Table 6: Single threshold ﬁscal rule estimates.




ˆ γx -1.2 -1.8
68% conﬁdence interval [-1.5, 1.1] [-1.9, -0.5]
95% conﬁdence interval [-2.8, 1.1] [-2.5, 0.9]
Cyclical sensitivities
ˆ β1 0.02 -0.06
0.56 -1.38
ˆ β2 0.21*** 0.13**
3.40 1.99
Observations in regime 1 96 58
Observations in regime 2 132 170
Notes: t statistics are in italics. * signiﬁcant at 10%;
** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 7: Test for the number of thresholds in ﬁscal policy rules.
Threshold variable: general government public debt as % of GDP
Real-time data Revised data
BL FL BL FL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test for single threshold
F1 9.99 6.60 5.14 3.99
p-value 0.311 0.583 0.676 0.881
critical values:
10% 15.67 14.68 13.82 14.31
5% 20.29 17.98 15.44 17.01
1% 27.77 25.49 20.57 26.09
Notes 1. The public debt is deﬁned as gross ﬁnancial liabilities
held by the general government.
2. as in Table 5.48
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Table 8: Estimates of the baseline (fully-real-time) ﬁscal policy rule: robustness checks.
Fiscal rule speciﬁcation
Columns 1,3,5,7,9: capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1 + βw + θdi,t−1|t−1 + ψemui,t−1|t−1 + εi,t
Columns 2,4,6,8,10:capbi,t|t−1 = αi + ρcapbi,t−1|t−1 + β1I(w ≤ 0)w + β2I(w>0)w + θdi,t−1|t−1 + ψemui,t−1|t−1 + εi,t
Benchmark HP Filter Real-time GDP Forward looking Election years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ˆ ρ 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.85***
34.88 35.31 35.87 35.81 35.36 35.40 34.63 32.88 35.06 35.51
w = xi,t−1|t−1 x
hp
i,t−1|t−1 gdpi,t−1|t−1 xi,t|t−1 xi,t−1|t−1
ˆ β 0.07* 0.11** 0.11*** 0.09* 0.07*
1.78 2.50 3.06 1.85 1.75
ˆ β1 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02
-0.42 0.35 -0.06 -0.47 -0.42
ˆ β2 0.24*** 0.24** 0.24*** 0.37*** 0.24***
3.23 2.35 3.12 3.17 3.25
ˆ θ 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.80 1.20 -0.35 -0.25 -0.11 0.01 0.75 1.16 0.17 0.49
ˆ ψ 0.47*** 0.35** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.35** 0.47*** 0.35**
3.25 2.37 2.96 2.94 3.24 3.24 3.32 2.23 3.26 2.37
Elections -0.16 -0.16*
-1.61 -1.68
Method FE-LS FE-LS FE-LS FE-LS FE-LS FE-LS IV IV FE-LS FE-LS
R2
Within 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 - - 0.87 0.87
Between 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 - - 0.99 0.99
Overall 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.86 0.86 0.95 0.95
Sargan-p ------ 0.18 0.11 - -
Obs 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Source: author own calculations based on the December Issues of the OECD Economic Outlook from No. 56
to No. 80.
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the benchmark estimates from Table 4 (fully-real-time speciﬁcation). The
estimates reported in Columns 3 and 4 are from regressions in which the output gap has been computed as
deviation from a trend estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter on real GDP series in levels, measured in real-
time. Columns 5 and 6 present the results when real-time values of the real GDP growth rate are used. Columns
7 and 8 present the results when the one-year-ahead forecast of the output gap is used. IV methods are employed
in the estimation. The instruments used are the current-year (for year t−1) output gap (positive and negative
output gaps are used in the regression of Column 8) and the current-year (for year t−1) unweighted average of
the output gap over the j  = i 18 OECD countries. t statistics are in italics. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Sample: 1994-2006.49
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Figure 1: Output gaps for some OECD countries from two data vintages. Data sources:
OECD Economic Outlook No. 68 (December 2000) and No. 80 (December 2006).50
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Figure 2: Cyclically-adjusted primary balances as percentage of potential GDP for some
OECD countries from two data vintages. Data sources: OECD Economic Outlook No. 68
(December 2000) and No. 80 (December 2006).51
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Figure 3: General government gross ﬁnancial liabilities as percentage of GDP for some
OECD countries from two data vintages. Data sources: OECD Economic Outlook No. 68
(December 2000) and No. 80 (December 2006).52
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Figure 4: Single threshold estimation. The graph refers to the case BL speciﬁcation, where
the threshold variable is the general government public debt as percentage of GDP and real-
time data are used (see equation (14)). Blue lines: likelihood ratio statistic LR1 (equation
(B.5)); green solid lines: 95% critical value (10.59); green dotted line: 68% critical value
(7.35).53
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